Featured Post

[TWR, 2025년 5월 19-23일] 대한민국 주요 5대 산업 주간 주가 예측 보고서

I. Executive Summary 본 보고서는 2025년 5월 19일부터 23일까지 예정된 미국의 주요 경제 지표 발표 일정과 주요 산업 컨퍼런스(CLEANPOWER 2025, TPD & Induced Proximity Pharma Part...

Popular Posts

Monday, October 12, 2026

Samsung and SK hynix: Net Selling, Buyback Runoff and the KOSPI’s Next Test

Korea market structure · October 12, 2026

The near-term risk is a weaker buyer base as repurchases run down. Foreign accounts sold both chip leaders heavily, but the direction changes by investor and time window. Samsung’s latest buying reportedly ended October 6; SK hynix was still approaching completion. That creates a conditional downside risk for the KOSPI, not a mathematically inevitable fall.

Flow cutoff: October 8, 2026, the latest fully populated session available from the provider at the October 12 check. Buyback status: October 12, 16:10 KST (UTC+9). Samsung common shares (005930) and SK hynix (000660); Samsung preferred shares are excluded. KRW = Korean won; bn = billion; tn = trillion.

₩22.80tnCombined foreign* net selling
20 sessions through October 8
₩6.79tnForeign* + institutional net selling
Last five sessions
₩2.11tnSK hynix buyback fills
October 6–8, exchange notices

*Foreign includes the provider’s “other foreign” category. Figures above are derived aggregates, not money leaving the entire market. Every executed sale has a buyer.


1. How much selling has actually occurred?

Over 20 sessions, foreign* net selling reached ₩6.507tn in Samsung and ₩16.298tn in SK hynix. Yet Samsung institutions bought a net ₩1.267tn over that window. Their position changed to net selling over the last five sessions. Retail investors bought both stocks on October 8 and over the last five sessions, but were net sellers over the full 20-session window.

This is therefore neither a uniform institutional exit nor a continuous retail rescue. The most persistent signal in this sample is foreign selling; the shorter window shows an additional shift in institutional demand. One-day flows should not replace the longer comparison.

Samsung Electronics · 1 session

October 8, 2026

Net buying (+) / selling (−)
InvestorKRW tnMillion shares
Foreign*-0.348-1.307
Institutions-1.081-4.088
Retail+1.393+5.259

SK hynix · 1 session

October 8, 2026

Net buying (+) / selling (−)
InvestorKRW tnMillion shares
Foreign*-0.866-0.513
Institutions-0.046-0.023
Retail+0.211+0.130

Samsung Electronics · 5 sessions

October 1–8, 2026

Net buying (+) / selling (−)
InvestorKRW tnMillion shares
Foreign*-1.237-4.599
Institutions-1.167-4.440
Retail+1.019+3.980

SK hynix · 5 sessions

October 1–8, 2026

Net buying (+) / selling (−)
InvestorKRW tnMillion shares
Foreign*-4.080-2.325
Institutions-0.304-0.176
Retail+0.299+0.212

Samsung Electronics · 20 sessions

September 8–October 8, 2026

Net buying (+) / selling (−)
InvestorKRW tnMillion shares
Foreign*-6.507-25.202
Institutions+1.267+4.256
Retail-3.936-13.392

SK hynix · 20 sessions

September 8–October 8, 2026

Net buying (+) / selling (−)
InvestorKRW tnMillion shares
Foreign*-16.298-9.225
Institutions-0.739-0.454
Retail-3.689-1.842

Rounded to three decimals for readability; rounding can hide small differences. 1 session = October 8; 5 sessions = October 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8; 20 sessions = September 8–October 8. No calendar-day extrapolation is used. Source: author’s sums of Samsung and SK hynix daily flows supplied by maedong.kr, which identifies its series as KRX-only and excludes NXT.

Definitions, freshness and reconciliation

Net value is purchases minus sales in won; net quantity is purchased shares minus sold shares. These are separate measures. Net value divided by net shares is not a valid investor execution VWAP. The source’s money fields have KRW1 million resolution even though the field unit is won.

October 12 flow fields were still null when checked; null is not zero. The provider’s general metadata was provisional and carried a newer market date, so this article uses the last populated flow date rather than silently treating the metadata date as complete. It is an independent provider’s processed series, not a direct, independently certified KRX download.

For October 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8, all 20 institutional/retail stock-day rows matched Pinpoint News’s later-day KRX-attributed tables within published rounding. Earlier 15:30 snapshots can differ. Foreign figures are not directly comparable: the provider explicitly includes “other foreign”, while the comparison tables do not specify that inclusion; the differences were not fully reconciled and the series are not blended. Other corporations and other categories are not shown, so these three groups need not sum to zero.

2. Buyback completion is a sequence, not one date

Samsung: buying reportedly finished

The August 21 decision authorized about ₩15tn of common-stock purchases from August 24 to November 21. Its stated purpose was employee/executive share compensation, with the acquired shares held in treasury.

The October 6 exchange execution notice records 1,056,305 shares filled, worth ₩292.226bn, and cumulative fills of 56,856,305 shares. SBS Biz reported on October 12 that the program finished October 6. Samsung is absent from the complete October 7 and 8 execution notices.

Completion is described as reported. A formal acquisition-result filing and its exact final cash total were not retrieved. This tranche is not a promise to cancel those shares.

SK hynix: still winding down

The August 19 filing authorized about ₩40.004tn, with a planned August 20–November 19 window. The company says shares acquired under this program will be cancelled after acquisition completion.

Actual fills were 400,000 shares on each of October 6, 7 and 8, worth ₩717.283bn, ₩697.989bn and ₩691.536bn respectively. October 8 cumulative quantity was 20,050,000 shares. An October 12 order for 400,000 shares and contemporaneous coverage still described the program as active or nearing completion.

An order is not a fill. October 12 execution and a completed cancellation were not verified. “Expected this week” is a forecast, not an accomplished event.

Both initial share quantities were calculated from reference prices and could vary with execution prices. Exceeding an indicative quantity, reaching an originally planned deadline, filing a purchase result and cancelling treasury shares are different events. Nor is an announced budget the same as the budget still available today.

The economic channel: while a company is buying, it is one source of demand. Once purchases stop, that demand disappears. No new sell order is mechanically created. Whether price falls depends on other buyers, the information already priced in and the supply of shares offered at each price.

3. Put the flow in scale before predicting a price

At the October 8 reference close, Samsung was ₩262,000 with common-equity market capitalization of ₩1,531.725tn; SK hynix was ₩1,681,000 with ₩1,227.958tn. Their reported KRX-day turnover was approximately ₩5.617tn and ₩5.457tn respectively; the provider lists NXT separately. These are dated reference figures, not today’s live prices.

Twenty-session foreign* plus institutional selling equals approximately 0.342% of Samsung’s October 8 capitalization and 1.387% of SK hynix’s. This is a scale comparison, not an estimate of price impact: capitalization is not the available order book or free float. A small percentage of capitalization can still matter if marginal liquidity is thin.

Foreign* net selling / same-window KRX turnover (magnitude)
Stock1 session5 sessions20 sessions
Samsung6.19%6.03%7.20%
SK hynix15.88%17.92%14.32%

Matching the dates and venue changes the interpretation: SK hynix’s foreign selling was roughly twice Samsung’s share of turnover over 20 sessions. Samsung’s 20-session traded value was ₩90.348tn, or ₩4.517tn per session; Hynix’s was ₩113.844tn, or ₩5.692tn per session. These are value-based liquidity measures, not share-volume ADV or an estimated price-impact coefficient.

Turnover is summed from the provider’s dated KRX market-cap snapshots for the same sessions, with the October 8 close, capitalization and turnover cross-checked against FnGuide. NXT is excluded. “Other corporations” net buying cannot be relabelled as the issuer’s repurchases; use the execution notices for that leg. A causal flow model would also need order-book liquidity and whether trades supply or demand immediacy.

4. The most defensible quantitative framework

01 · MEASURE

Signed flow and participation

Sum daily net values and shares across actual sessions. Track 1/5/20-session direction and normalize by matching turnover. Check whether net selling is slowing before calling a reversal.

02 · ISOLATE

Issuer demand withdrawal

Use executed repurchases, not orders or announced budgets. Compare the buying period with the post-completion period while tracking price, depth and spread changes.

03 · TRANSLATE

Index-weight arithmetic

Use beginning-period constituent weights. The stocks’ contribution is weight × return; the rest of the market can amplify or offset it. A combined market-cap headline is not automatically an official index weight.

04 · TEST

Conditional abnormal returns

Compare each stock with a market/sector counterfactual and separate earnings, FX, rates and index-rebalancing news. Flow-return correlation alone is not causation.

Why a square-root impact equation is useful but insufficient

A common execution heuristic is impact ≈ Y × daily volatility × square root of (order quantity / daily volume), with the order’s direction supplying the sign. It concerns large executed parent orders, not a daily investor category’s net flow. Y and the permanent-versus-temporary component must be estimated for the market and execution style.

Research also finds that duration and participation rate matter and that the square-root approximation has a limited range. Subtracting a buyback budget from market capitalization, or inserting aggregate foreign selling into this equation with an arbitrary coefficient, does not yield a defensible KOSPI target. This article therefore does not manufacture such a target.

What a proper event study would require

Estimate a pre-event model such as stock return = intercept + market factor + semiconductor factor + FX factor + residual. Prefer a benchmark excluding the two stocks, or explicitly address their heavy overlap with the KOSPI. Abnormal return is the observed return minus that model’s prediction; cumulative abnormal return sums the residuals through the event window.

Pre-specify the event as the last executed purchase date; distinguish it from the announcement and disclosure dates. Test alternative windows, robust errors, pre-trends and placebo dates. A panel of comparable completed programs would help separate common shocks from issuer-specific events. October 8 also coincided with Samsung’s earnings release, options expiry and reported ETF rebalancing, so attributing the whole move to buyback completion would be unsound.

The available 20-session flow sample and very short post-Samsung-completion window do not support a calibrated causal coefficient or probability forecast. No fitted regression, statistically significant effect or backtest result is claimed here. A forecasting model would need a longer, point-in-time price/flow history, out-of-sample testing and trading-cost assumptions.

5. How the two stocks can move the KOSPI

For a single period with fixed beginning weights and no special index adjustments, approximate index return (%) = Samsung weight × Samsung return + SK hynix weight × SK hynix return + remaining weight × remaining-market return. Weights enter as fractions. This is an accounting sensitivity, not a forecast of any component’s return.

Illustrative inputs only. The 25% and 20% weights below are teaching assumptions, not verified current KOSPI constituent weights. An official dated weight file was not obtained. Replace them before using the calculation as a current index exposure estimate.
Illustration A: both chip stocks fall 5%, the rest is flat

Assume Samsung starts at 25% of the index and SK hynix at 20%. Their combined contribution is (0.25 × −5%) + (0.20 × −5%) = −2.25 percentage points. If the remaining 55% is flat, the illustrative index return is −2.25%.

Illustration B: both chip stocks fall 5%, the rest rises 2%

The chip contribution remains −2.25 points. The remaining 55% contributes 0.55 × 2% = +1.10 points, making the illustrative index return −1.15%. A diversified rally offsets some of the chip drag.

Illustration C: Samsung falls 5%, SK hynix falls 10%

With the same assumed weights and the rest of the market flat, (0.25 × −5%) + (0.20 × −10%) = −3.25%. Different stock returns matter even when combined weight is unchanged. None of these scenarios has an assigned probability.

6. Which direction is most reasonable to expect?

Judgment: the evidence supports near-term fragility and a downside bias conditional on persistent selling after issuer demand disappears. It does not establish that a further fall is the most likely outcome with a measurable probability. The size of the observed foreign selling and the recent institutional shift justify watching the transition closely; a price target would require evidence this dataset does not provide.

Continued pressure

Foreign* and institutional five-session flows stay negative, actual issuer fills stop, and prices make lower lows with broad market weakness. In that combination, both chip-stock contributions and the rest-of-market term can be negative. This is the clearest continuation case.

Absorption and stabilization

Selling slows or remains high while prices stop falling, spreads normalize and non-chip breadth improves. That would suggest replacement demand is absorbing supply. Buyback completion alone would then be a poor bearish timing signal.

Relief and renewed demand

Foreign flows turn positive across several sessions, institutions confirm and earnings expectations or global semiconductor conditions improve. A rebound could occur despite completed buybacks. A single positive session is insufficient to establish that regime change.

The next checks should be actual Hynix fills and completion evidence, rolling flow changes, price response per unit of selling, market breadth and the behavior of peer semiconductor markets. National-market confidence is a separate hypothesis: foreign selling alone is not evidence of a sovereign rating downgrade. Testing a Korea-specific risk premium would require currency, sovereign credit spreads and sector-adjusted relative valuation alongside these stock flows.

Sources and calculation notes

  1. maedong.kr public API definitions, Samsung series, SK hynix series and source limitations. This article publishes a small derived aggregate summary, not a raw-data mirror.
  2. Evening cross-checks: Pinpoint News for October 1, October 2, October 6, October 7 and October 8.
  3. Samsung’s August 21 buyback decision; SK hynix’s August 19 KIND filing; SK hynix’s official explanation.
  4. Exchange execution notices reproduced by Maeil Business: October 6, October 7, October 8.
  5. Completion-status reporting: SBS Biz, October 12; Newsway, October 12 at 15:17 KST; October 12 buyback orders.
  6. October 8 close, capitalization and separate KRX/NXT turnover: FnGuide’s IBK company monitor for Samsung and SK hynix.
  7. KRX on market-cap weighting; MacKinlay (1997), event-study methodology; Zarinelli and co-authors, market-impact limits. These sources support the methods, not a fitted forecast for these stocks.
  8. October 8 earnings, expiry and rebalancing context. Multiple simultaneous events complicate causal attribution.

General market research and education. No personal investment recommendation, guaranteed outcome or calibrated trading signal is offered. Facts, derived calculations and conditional judgments are identified separately; newer prices and filings can change the analysis.